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Summary  findings
Mengistae analyzes production  and labor market data for  marginal product  of a mobile worker with 16 or more
a random selection of small to medium-size firms in  years of experience is still nearly 80 percent  higher than
Ethiopia to answer two questions:  that of the base group.
Does a worker's  marginal productivity increase with  The between-jobs growth of hourly wages with
time in the labor market or with job seniority, as must be  potential experience is also large, but not as large as
the case if on-the-job skill formation  or job matching has  growth in marginal productivity for workers with less
anything to do with the dynamics of wages observed in  than 15 years of experience.
the data?  Mengistae concludes that job matching is far more
Assuming that marginal productivity grows with  important  than skill formation  as a source of growth in
experience or seniority, is skill formation more or less  productivity. Net mobility gains account for at least
important than job matching as a source of growth in  twice the share of the return to skill formation in the
productivity?  observed between-jobs growth of wages with market
The main feature of Mengistae's analysis is the joint  experience.
regression of the log of the average product of hours in a  The rate of return to skills formation is higher in the
firm and the log of average hourly earnings of a firm's  United States than in Ethiopia. The relative return to
employees on the shares of experience-seniority cells of  skills formation is probably lower in Ethiopia partly
workers in total annual hours in the firm.  because the flow of information  about the labor market
Marginal productivity falls as experience in the labor  is more restricted there.
market passes the  15-year mark, but the expected
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1  Introduction
The  concavity of individual  wage rates  in labour  market  experience  and job
seniority  is a well established  empirical  regularity.  Also well known is the
fact  that  the  phenomenon  is consistent  with  a rasnge of competing  models
of wage determination.  On the  one hand,  we have implicit  contract  models
predicting rising experience and seniority proffles of wages against flat profiles
of marginal  productivity  as  a mechanism  of income  insurance  for workers
against  ability  risk  (Harris  and  Holmstrom,  1982) or the  labour  market's
solution  to  the  problem  of moral  hazard  (Lazear,  1979,  1981) or  adverse
selection (Salop and  Salop, 1976). In contrast  to these, human capital  theory
and  the  hypothesis  of job-matching1 associate  rising  profiles of wages with
a rising profile of marginal  productivity.  According to  the  theory  of human
1I use this phrase quite broadly as a characterisation  of models  of permanent and
voluntary  job separation in which a worker's  mobility  decisions  depend on the arrival
of information  on the quality of the current job match given  outside alternatives  or on
prospective  matches given  the worker's  perception  of the quality of the current match.
The reference  therefore  includes  Burdett's (1978)  model  of on-the-job  search  and the job
shopping  models  of Johnson  (1978)  and Jovanovic(1979)  as extreme  abstractions  in which
skill  formation,  uncertainity  and information  asymmetry  are all assumed  away,  as well  as
their extensions  to take one or more  of these into account  as in Jovanovic  (1979b,1984),
Mortensten  (1988)  and Topel (1991).
1capital,  a worker earns  more as he  gets older because  his marginal  product
increases with time in the labour market  as return  to on-the-job  investment in
general skills (Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1962, 1974; Ben Porath,  1967; Heckman,
1974). Likewise, wages rise with job seniority  because marginal productivity
grows with time on a job as return to investment in firm specific skills (Becker,
1962; Oi,  1962; and  Hashimoto,  1979).  Moreover,  on-the-job  general  skill
formation  is financed  entirely  by the  worker by means  of earning  less than
the  value of his marginal  product  for the  duration  of the  investment.  The
cost  of investment  in  specific skills  is shared  between  the  worker  and  the
firm by  means  of the  worker earning  more than  the  value  of his marginal
product  over the duration  of investment but  giving up a share  of the returns
thereafter.
Neither of these temporal  wedges between wages and marginal  productiv-
ity is operational  in models of pure job  matching.  In such models a worker
is assumed  to  earn  his spot  marginal  product  and  the  growth  of marginal
productivity  with  time in the labour market  or with job seniority  arises sim-
ply as a sample selection effect of mobility decisions.  As in basic models of
human  capital  theory, uncertainty  and information  asymmetry  are assumed
away and job separation  is always voluntary  and permanent.  However, there
is no room  for on-the-job  skill formation  since a worker's intrinsic  potential
productivity  is predetermined  in relation to whatever  happens following entry
to  the labour  market  or the  assumption  of a particular  job.  What  changes
during  time  in the  labour  market  or tenure  over  a job  is not  the  worker's
skill but  the  amount of information available to him on his relative  marginal
productivity  in  alternative  job  matches  as the  basis for mobility  decisions.
Underlying  an  observed  distribution  of individual  wage rates  is therefore  a
distribution  of the  marginal  productivity  of matches  rather  than  of individ-
uals per se. In a world where jobs are 'pure  inspection  goods',  as is the case
in Burdett's  (1978) model,  mobility decisions are made  upon  the  arrival  of
information  on the  productivity  of prospective  matches.  Consequently,  the
expected marginal  product  of a worker must be larger than  that  of a younger
worker in a cross section on account  of being better  matched  to  his current
job,  having  sampled  and  rejected  a larger  number  of alternatives.  In  the
opposite  world where jobs  are 'pure  experience  goods',  as is the  case in the
Jovanovic (1979) model, mobility decisions are based on new information  on
the  marginal  productivity  of the  current  match.  Here,  a  senior  worker on
a job has  a higher expected  marginal  product  than  a junior  worker because
senior workers are less uncertain  of the true  productivity  of their  match  and,
2consequently, include fewer poorly matched  workers. In an extension  of Bur-
dett's  model,  Topel  (1991) proposes  one in which, in  sharp  contrast  to  the
Jovanovic model, mobility biases can create the appearance  of marginal pro-
ductivity  and  wages falling with job-seniority  despite  the fact that  the  more
productive  is a job  match  the  more durable  it is as in Jovanovic  (1979).2
In this  paper,  I analyse production  and labour  market  data  on a random
selection of small to  medium sized manufacturing  firms in Ethiopia  in order
to  answer two  complementary  questions.  First,  does  a  worker's  marginal
productivity  increase with time in the labour market  or with job seniority, as
must be the case if on-the-job  skill formation  or jolb matching  have anything
to do with the dynamics of wages as observed in the data?  Secondly, assuming
that  marginal  productivity  does indeed grow with labour  market  experience
or job  seniority, how important  is skill formation  relative  to match  effects as
a source of growth in productivity?  The main  feature  of the  analysis is the
joint  regression  of the  log of the  average product  of hours in  a firm and the
log of average hourly  earnings of its employees on the  shares  of experience-
seniority  cells of workers in total  annual  hours  in the  firm.  Although  there
is  evidence that  both  marginal  product  and  the  wage  rate  rise  with  job-
seniority,  the  amount  by which  they  do so is very  small.  However, both
do grow substantially  with  market  experience.  Taking  workers in  the  0-5
years  experience-seniority  cell as the  base  group,  I find  that  the  expected
marginal product  of a fully mobile worker 3 grows by 65 per  cent relative  to
the base as experience increases from 5 to  10 years.  A further  5 year increase
in experience raises  expected  marginal product  to more than  double that  of
the base group  assuming mobility is maintained.  Marginal  productivity  falls
as market  experience  passes the  15-year mark,  but  the  expected  marginal
product  of a mobile  worker with  16 years or  more experience  is still nearly
80 per  cent  higher than  that  of the  base  group.  The  between-jobs  growth
of hourly  wages with  potential  experience  is also large,  but  not  as large as
growth  in marginal  productivity  for workers with  less than  fifteen  years of
experience.  This and the fact that  I cannot reject the null that  older workers
earn  their  marginal  product  is evidence that  at  least  some of the  observed
2The empirical  framework  to be  developed in the  next  section  is based on Topel  (1991)
because  of  the  model's  generality  in  that  it  generates  predictions  about  the  effects  of
job  matching  on the  experience  and  seniority  profiles of wages and  productivity  without
assuming  away skill formation,  uncertainty  or information  asymmetry.
3By a  'fully mobile worker'  I mean a worker  who changes jobs  at  least  once every five
years.
3growth in wages is return  to  general skill formation.  However, there  is also
evidence of significant mobility effects in the same growth.  Indeed, individual
earning  function  analysis  of data  on workers sampled  from  the  same  firms
and time  periods  for which the  firm level average productivity  and  average
wage  equations  are estimated  indicates  that  mobility  gains  are by  far  the
single most  important  source of the  observed between-jobs  growth  of wages
with  experience.  The  ratio  of the  estimated  net  mobility  gain to  between-
jobs wage growth  due to  other sources including skill formation  ranges from
1.9 to  3.5.
To my knowledge, this  is the  first attempt  at simultaneously  testing  for
skill formation  and  mobility effects in wage growth.  The rest  of the paper  is
organised as follows. Section 2 proposes an empirical framework in which the
job-matching  and  skill formation  hypotheses  can be tested  using  firm level
cross-section data on work force characteristics  and compensation.  Results of
the application  of the method to the Ethiopian  data  are presented  in Section
3. I conclude with  a summary  and a brief assessment  in Section 4.
2  Empirical  Framework
2.1  Estimating  Profiles  of  Relative  Marginal  Produc-
tivity  and  Relative  Wages
Consider a population  of n workers distributed  as full time employees between
m  firms.  Let  wij  be  the  hourly  wage worker  i  is  observed  to  earn  as  an
employee of firm j  where i =  1, .., n and j  =  1, ..., m.  Let also yij, i =  1, ..., n,
j  =  1, ..., m,  be  the  corresponding  hourly  product  of worker  i  in  firm j,
defined as the  hourly  value added of i given other production  inputs  in j.  I
shall assume,  for the  time  being, that  all workers are identical  with  respect
to  observable  characteristics  influencing  earnings  or  productivity  with  the
exception  of two variables, namely, time in the  labour market  in years, Xlij,
and time  on the  current  job  in years,  X2ij.  I will also assume  that  wij  and
yij  are log linear  in X,ij  and  X2ij so that4
'Second and higher  order terms in market experience  and job seniority  will  be intro-
duced  in the empirical  work  to be reported  as will  be other observable  characteristics  such
as schooling.  As will  be evident  later, their suppression  in the specification  of the earning
and productivity  functions  considered  here  does not involve  any loss  of generality  to the
statements  made in this section.
4In wij = Xiija'  + X2ijac  + ciF  (1)
and
ln yij =  X1ijOs3  + X2ij 32 +  e  (2)
where,  ai,  a  ,  p3  and  /2  are  constants  and  &ij  and  eY. are random  error
terms  summing up influences of unobservables.  The parameter  as measures
the  expected  return  to  an  additional  year  in  the  labour  market  while  ac2
is the  expected  return  to  an  additional  year on  the  current  job.  A rising
experience profile of wages means a'  is positive,  while a rising job  seniority
profile of wages means  as  is positive.  Either  of these  cases  is observed  in
the  data  if there  is on-the-job  acquisition  of skills,  or wage  determination
involves, for example,  a scheme of income  insurance  for workers,  as in the
model  of Harris  and  Holmstrom  (1982), or  deferment  of compensation  as
a  disciplining  or  screening  device,  as in  Lazear  (1979,  1981) or  Salop  and
Salop  (1976). The observation  a'  > 0 or a'  >  0 is therefore  a necessary but
not  sufficient condition  for not  rejecting  the  skill-formation  hypothesis.  A
sufficient condition  for not  rejecting  the  same hypathesis  is the  observation
,3' > 0 given a'  > 0 or the observation  p2  > 0 given. a'  >  0.
The job-matching  hypothesis is the proposition  that  an existing job match
is dissolved by a worker only in favour of a more productive  one so that  the
more productive  is the current  match  the more durable  it is.  If this  is indeed
the  case, the  error  terms  eF and  ey. must  be  correlated  with  the  regressors
X1li  and  X2ij  in  equations  2.1 and  2.2.  Consequently,  the  application  of
ordinary  least squares to either  equation  will produce biased estimates  of the
true  effects of market  experience  and  job  seniority  even in  the  absence  of
individual  heterogeneity  in unobserved  ability.  Folliwing  Topel (1991), let
Eiwj  =  tti@7  +  Hi  +  Vii  (3)
and
CY.  =  iy +  i  + i4§  (4)
where  O'W  and  iy. are match  effects,  jsw  and  jty  are  individual  effects and
Vi  and  vy. are  iid,  zero-mean  error  terms  orthogonal  to  experience,  job-
seniority,  match  effects and  individual  effects such that  E(vy@,  vy.)  =  Oh,y
Assume further  that
5X-Xia,  + X,  -a" + ui¢w  (5)
-i.j  Xiijbt  + X2ijb" + utu  (6)
=  X2 ija2  + u7  (7)
14 =X 2 ijb/2  ±  (8)
where  al,  a2', a2, bt,  b62,  and  b2 are  constants  and  each  of ui  ,  uiw,  &'
u8y is an iid zero-mean error term  orthogonal  to Xlij,  X2ij, vlw and  vy.5  In
general, existing evidence is a2, b2 > 0, that  is, other things  being equal, more
able workers are less mobile. 6 I shall take  Topel's  (1991) search  and  match
technology as a working hypothesis  in what  follows to assume  a+,  bt  > 0 and
a+, bX < 0 but  a" + ao',  bt + bO  > 0.  The first of these inequalities  states  the
implication  of the  same technology  that  the  current  wage of an  individual
is the  maximum  offer he has  had  since joining  the  labour  market  which,  in
terms of the  productivity  equation,  means that  the  current  match  is at least
as productive  as any of the alternative  matches  he has inspected to date.  The
second is a statement  of the implication that  mobility occurs only if it pays so
that,  in view of a',,  3  >  0, the expected  wage/marginal  product  of movers
at  their  initial  jobs  is higher  than  the  expected  wage/marginal  product  of
stayers.'.  The third  inequality  is a  statement  of two propositions,  namely,
that  the more paying or productive  is a match,  the  more durable  it is, and
that  the  net gain from mobility of movers is positive.  The first  of these  can
be read, for example, from equation  2.5 by rewriting  it as
=  Xloiat  + X2ij (at  + a+) + u'J  (9)
5Equations  (2.7)  and  (2.8) imply E(XlijAiH) = 0.  This is not a strong  assumption  since
it only means that  unobserved  ability cannot  differ systematically  between  generations  of
workers.
6See, for example,  Mincer  and  Jovanovic  (1981).  As will be  reported  later,  there  is
evidence of a positive  correlation  between job-seniority  and  unobserved  ability  in the  data
anlysed here  as well.
7It should be noted  that  this  does not apply  if there  is no true  return  to job seniority  in
terms  of wages or productivity.  The  result  also assumes  the  absence of on-the-job  search
costs or that  such costs  are  always less than  mobility  costs  (Topel,  1991).
6where  Xij  =_  Xii  -X 2ij,  is initial  market  experience.  The  second  can be
read from the same equation  by rewriting  it as
!J =  -X 0 a2  + X1ij (a"  +  a'2) +  Uw  (10)
Substituting  from equations  2.5 and  2.7 into equation  2.1 and from equa-
tions  2.6 and  2.8 into 2.2 gives
Inwij  = Xijaol  + X2iia2 + ql  (11)
and
ln yij = X1 ij 1 + X2 i 2 +±?  (12)
where
al  =  as +ao  (13)
a!2  =  a's  +  a)  +  all
31=  38 + b"  (14)
I32  =  32 +  62' +  V2
j1  =  v + uW,  + U~T  (15)
77.  =  vY.  +  U..  +UI&
73  S3  3  t3li
and  E(,qFqY-)  =  ,a.
If yij were directly observable, least squares applied to 2.11 and 2.12 would
yield consistent  estimates  of the  parameters  a,,  (12,  3 1 Qand  32.  WVhile  such
estimates  would not  be useful to test  for a skill formation  effect or a match
effect separately, they would nonetheless suffice as a basis for testing  the null
that  neither  of the two effects is present  in the  data.  The  null is rejected  if
we observe that  31 > 0 given a1 > 0 or  12  > 0 given a2 >  0-
Although  yij is not  directly observable, firm level average productivity  of
hours is. The fact that  the latter  is a function  of the firm level average of Yij
can then be exploited to obtain estimates  of the paxameters of equations  2.11
and 2.12 on the basis of firm level observations  of the average wage rate  and
the  average  productivity  of hours.  Define the  following dummy  vaxiables:
i  =  1 if X1ij<k;  Di  = 1 if X2ij < k 1 ; Dx  1 if X1ij > kG; DGi  =1
if X2 .j>kc;  D`i 3 = 1 if kg-,  < X1ij  < kgg  =2,...G;  and DT  -1f
7kg-,  <  X2ij < kg,g  = 2,...G;  where  k1, kg and  kG are known constants.  Let
also all,  a21, a!g  and OC2g  be constants such that
G




Equation  2.11 can then be written  in terms of dummy variables of experience-
seniority  intervals  as
G  G
wij =  ao+  E  algD-+  E  a29DDT + qi  (16)
g=2  g=2
where ao =  all  + a21. With  a similar  definition of parameters  Iall,  I21, 
3 1g
and  p2g,  equation  2.12 can likewise be written  as
G  G
Inyij =3  +  S  OlgDgXij+ E  02 9 DgT +  iYj  (17)
g=2  9=2
where )30  =  011  +  021
It might be worth noting at this point that  any specification of the earning
or productivity  equation  involving second  or higher  order  terms  in experi-
ence and  job  seniority  can be  arrived  at  as the  limiting  function  to  which
equation  2.16 or 2.17 approaches as G tends  to infinity.  No loss of generality
is therefore  entailed  by the  fact  that  I started  off by suppressing  the terms
in arriving  at the same equations.  It  is also more convenient to  express the
equations  in  dummy  variables  for experience-seniority  cells of observations
rather  than  in those  for experience or seniority intervals.  Assume, for exam-
ple, that  G = 3, suppress  worker and employer subscripts  and define dummy
variables as follows: Dgh  =  DgD  , h = 1,..., G so that  Dgh  =  1 ifD  =  1
and  DhT  =  1, but  Dgh  =  0, otherwise.  Equation  2.16 can then  be written  as
In  w = ao+a 12D21+al 3D31+(a1 2+t 2 2)D22+(al3+Ce 32) D32+(ael3+Ce3 3)D33+±w
(18)
In view of 2.13, each of the coefficients a 12 and a13 iS composed of a true
experience effect, a',  and  a mobility  gain or match  improvement  effect, ag,
so that
°eg = cs + ag  (19)
8where  aq, >  0, g = 2, 3.  Consider,  in  contrast,  the expected  experience  and
seniority premium  of a non-mobile worker at experience level g.  This cannot
include  a mobility gain but  does include a true  experience  effect, a',  a true
seniority  effect, a'  , a match  quality  effect, a5 9 , and  an unobservable  ability
effect algg,  so that  we have, in equation  2.18,
aig  +  agg =  at  + asg  +  a  +  aA  (20)
and, hence,
=  agg + agg  + agg  -aO  (21) 99 99  ~  gg 
Consider next the  expected experience and seniority premium  of a worker at
experience  level g but  in an  intermediate  state  of mobility, i.e., at seniority
level h such that  1 <  h  < g.  This  must  have the  same  components  as the
expected  premium  of a  non-mobile  worker  except; that,  like the  expected
premium  of a' fully mobile worker, it includes a mobility  gain, aglh,  so that
a 19 g + agh  - as  +  ash  + a+h + a"  +  aOh  (22)
where,  1 < h < g. Hence,
agh = agh +  h +  aghh +  ag  - (23)
Going back to  equation  2.18, denote
Ag =  1 +alg  (24)
Agh  =  1 +  a2h/Ag
so that  AgAgh  =  1 + aig +  a2h  . The equation  can then be  written  as
lnw  =  ao + (A 2 - 1)D 21 + (A 3 -1)Ds3 + (A 2A22 -1)D22
+(3A32  - 1)D32 + (A3A 33 - 1)D33 + Tf  (25)
Likewise, equation  2.17 can be written  as
lny  =  f 0 + (62-  1)D 21 + (63 - 1)D 31 4- (62622-1)D22
+(63632  -1)D 32 + (63633  - 1)D 3 3 +  'y  (26)
where,
6g  =  1 +  3lg  (27)
6 gh  =  1+  /32h/lb
9so that  6g
3 gh  1 +  01  +  12h,
OIg  =  gs +bg  (28)
Ogg =  g+g  + b'gg  +  M  -bg
I 3 gh  h=1  h<
Ogh  =  Ogh  + bg  + bgh + b'g-bg)71< 
where  the  components  of 81g, Ogg  and  fgh  are defined in  strict  analogy to
those  of  ,lg, agg and  agh.  Consider  the average hourly  wage, Wj, of workers
employed in firm j.  Equation  2.25 means8
nj
w;  =  (1/nj) exp  ao  E  (1 + (A 2 - 1)D 2 1ij + (A-  1)D 3 1ij  +  (A2A22 -1)D22i
i=
+(/\ 3A32 - 1)D 32 ij +  (A3A33  - 1)D 33 i,  + 7i
where  nj  is the  number  of workers in firm j.  This  leads  to  the  firm level
average wage rate  equation
lnwj  =  ao + ln[1 + (A 2 - 1)P2lj +  (A3 - 1)P31j +  (A2A22 - 1)P 22 j
+(A3 \32 - 1)P 323 + (A 3\33 - 1)P33 j +  ±j'1  (29)
nj
where Vj' =  1/nj  E  t!,  Pghj  =  nghj/nj,  and nghj is the number of workers
i=l
of experience  level g and  seniority  level h  in firm j  so that,  assuming  the
same number  of hours for each worker, Pgh 3 measures  the  relative  share  of
the same group of workers in total  hours in the firm.  Similarly, equation  2.26
means  the  that  the  average  hourly  value added,  -y,  of workers of firm j  is
determined  as
lnyj  =  0 ±  + ln[1  +  (62-  1)P2 1j  +  (63  - 1)P3 1i  +  (62622-  1)P22 i
+(63632 - 1)P323 +  (63633 - 1)P 3 33 +  (30)
For the purpose of estimation,  I shall approximate  equations  (2.29) and (2.30)
by
lnwj  - ao +  ln[l  +  (A 2 - 1)P21j  +  (A3 - 1)P31j  +  (A 2 22-)P22j
+ ()3A32  - 1)P32, +  (A 3A33 - 1)  P33j] + rj  (31)
8This uses the first order Taylor series approximation exp x as 1 + x.
10and
Inyj  =  30 + ln[1 +  (62 - 1)P 21j +  (63 - 1)P31j  +  (62622 -)P22i
+(63632 - 1)P 323 +  (63633 - 1)P 33j] +-  (32)
respectively.
Although equation 2.32 is not estimable as it is, its parameters can be es-
timated since the conditional  expectation of yj enters the production function
of j  as the quality index of the firm's labour input.  Suppose the production
function is Cobb-Douglas 9 so that
E(YjIKj, Lj) = AK7j Lj"I  (33)
where, A, -yl and 72 are constants, Yj is the value added of firm j,  Kj  is the
corresponding capital input and Lj  is the firm's input  of quality adjusted
hours. Let Hj be the firm's total input of unadjusted hours. I define Lj by
Lj = HjE(j  IP21j,  P 22j, P31j, P32j, P33j)  (34)
Using 2.32, the  average productivity of unadjusted hours, Yj  Yj/Hj,  in
the firm is then given by
InYj  =  -7O  +  -Yi n  (j)  +(+  72 -1)  ln  Hj + Y2 ln[1 + (62 - 1)P21 3+  (63 -1)P 3 1 j
+(62622  - 1)P223 +  (63632  - 1)P323 +  (63633  - 1)P 33j] + (j  (35)
where 70 = hn  A+y 2,60 and (j  is a random error term including i7j'  as a compo-
nent  and, hence, generally correlated  with  V  but  assumed  to  be orthogonal
to  all regressors. 10
The joint estimation  of equations  2.31 and 2.35 is the basis for the testing
of skill formation  and job-matching  effects in wage growth as will be reported
9The  Cobb-Douglas  specification  is used  in the  empirical  work to  be  reported  in the
next  section  since it  could  not  be  rejected  against  the  translog.  It  should  be  noted  that
the  basic  arguments  and  derivations  of  this  section  are  valid  for any  flexible functional
form and  are in no way dependent  on the  assumption  of the  Cobb-Douglas  function.
l°If  the  firm's labour  input  were homogenous,  we would have ,0  = 0 and  the  experience
and  seniority  profiles  of  productivity  would  both  be  flat  so that  69  =  1 and  bgh  =  1
for all g and  h,  in which  case E(YjIP21,P22,P31,P32,P33)  =  1 and  equation  7.35 would
collaps  to  the  usual  specification  whereby  the  conditional  expectation  of  lnYj  is simply
ln  A +  l ln (K2)  + (71 + 72 -1)  ln H.in the  next  section."  In  interpreting  the  average wage rate  equation,  it  is
important  to note that  a0 is the log of the expected hourly wage of a worker at
the lowest level of market  experience and the lowest level of job-seniority, i.e.,
a worker for which Dx  = 1 and  DT.  = 1. The parameter  Ag is the  expected
hourly  wage of a  worker at  the  lowest level of seniority  and  at  experience
level g relative the  base wage e'°.  The parameter  Agh  is the expected  hourly
wage of a worker at  experience  level g and  job  seniority  level h  relative  to
Ag, where 1 < h < g.  Consequently,  AgAgh,  1 < h < g is the  expected  hourly
wage of a worker at  experience  level g and  seniority  level h relative  to  the
'1 Hellerstein  and  Neumark(1995)  derive wage  and  productivity  equations  of a similar
form  as 2.31  and  2.35 but  for age categories  of workers  only and  from  the  perspective  of
the  firm  rather  than  of  the  labour  market  as  is done  here.  As should  be  evident  from
the  discussion  that  follows it would be  impossible  to test  the job-matching  hypothesis  on
the  basis  of the  age-profile of productivity  unless  it is estimated  simultaneously  with  the
job-seniority  profile of the  same.  The  derivation  of the  age profile  of productivity  as is
done  in the  Hellerstein  and  Neumark  paper  is also problematic  although  it  leads to  the
same functional  form  as used  in this  paper.  The  starting  point  in their  approach  is that
the  average productivity  of hours  in a firm is a weighted mean  of the  average productivity
of hours  of skill  groups  of workers just  as the  average  hourly  wage  paid  out  by  the  firm
is a  weighed mean  of hourly  earnings  of the  same groups.  The  problem  with  viewing the
average  wage  rate  and  average  productivity  of hours  from  the  point  of view  of the  firm
rather  than  from that  of its  employees is that  the  economic meaning  of the error  term  one
then  appends  to the  productivity  or  wage rate  equation  becomes  unclear.  In  particular,
one would not be able to motivate  the inclusion of unobserved  ability and job-match  effects
as  components  of the  error  term  if, for example,  one  conceived of the  dependent  variable
of the wage equation  as the  unit cost of labour  to the firm rather  than  the  average  hourly
earning  of the  firm's  employees.
12base wage, e°  12
In interpreting  equation  2.35 it is useful to  note that
E(YjlP21j,P22j,P31i,P32j,P33j)  =  e° [1 + (62-  l)P21j + (63-1)P 31j + (62622-1)P22j
+(63632  - l)P 323 + (63633  - 1)P 333]  (36)
so that
Lj = e° [H"ij  + 62H21j  +  633H31j  + 62622H 22j + 63632H32j + 63633H33j] (37)
where  Hghj  is the  total  number  of hours  of workers with  experience  level
g  and  job-seniority  level  h.  Let  YjL  =  9E(YjlKj,  j).  By substituting  from
equation  2.37 into equation  2.33, it can be seen that
aE  (Yj IKj, Lj)  -e~ooyL
while
0E(YjIKj,Lj)  _  g,0





1  <  h<g
'2To see this, note that we  have  from 2.31  that
E(wj/P21, P 22, P31,  P32,  P 33) = eo [Pi,  +A2P21 +A 3P 31 +A 2A22P 22+A 3A32P 32 +  A 3A33P 33]
where,  PI, is the proportion  of workers  in the base group. Assuming  that total annual
hours,  Hj, is fixed,  the expected  annual  wage  bill of the firm  is
E(Wj/P 2,, P22, P 31, P 32, P 33) _ HjE(wj/P 2 ,  P22, P 31, P 32, P 33)
= ec° [Hll + A2H 21 + A3H31 + A2A22H 22 + A 3A32H32 + A 3A 33H 33]
Let Wjll be the annual  wage  bill on workers  in the base group,  Wjg  the annual  wage  bill
of workers  at experience  level  g and seniority  level  one and Wigh  the annual  wage  bill on
workers  at experience  level  g and seniority  level h with g = 2,3 and 1 < h < g.  Then
E(WjlI/P 21 ,P 22,P3 1,P32,P33)  = e"0H1l,  E(Wjg/P21,P2 2,P3 1,P32 ,P33)  = Age" 0H.1 and
E(W 3gh/P 2l,  P2 2, P 3 1, P3 2, P33) =  AghAge°oH gh.  Consequently,  the  expected  hourly  wage
is eo  for workers  in the base group,  A9e° 0 for workers  at experience  level  g and seniority
level one and ;k 9hAgeto  for workers at experience level g and seniority level h.
13The parameter 69  is therefore the expected marginal product of a worker with
the  lowest level of seniority.at  experience level g relative to the  expected
marginal product  of a worker in the  base group.  The expected marginal
productivity of a worker at experience level g and seniority level h relative to
a worker with the lowest  level of seniority but at the same level of experience
is given  by 6gh, while  6gbgh  is the same expected marginal product but relative
to the expected marginal product of a worker in the base group.
2.2  Testing  for  Skill  Formation  and  Job  Matching  Ef-
fects  in Wage  Growth
The experience and job seniority profiles of relative wages as captured by
equation 2.31  can usefully  be summarised into an experience-seniority  'profile
matrix' in which each row describes  the job seniority profile of the expected
wage rate, relative to the base, of a worker at a given level of market expe-
rience and a column describes the experience profile  of the expected relative
wage of a worker at a given level of job-seniority:
1.00
A 2 A2A22
A 3 A3A3 2 A3A33
AG  AGAG2 AGAG3  ...  AGAGG
The corresponding  experience-seniority  profile  matrix of relative marginal
productivity as read from equation 2.35 is
1.00
62  62622
63  63632  63633
6G  6G
6 G2  6 G
6 G3  *..  6G
6 GG
Of particular interest in each matrix are the diagonal entries and entries
of the first column. The former map out the life cycle  growth of the expected
relative wage rate or relative marginal product of a non-mobile  worker, that
is, a worker who has never changed his job after the first k1 years of time
14in the labour market,  where  k, is the  maximum number  years in the labour
market  of a worker in the base group.  The first columln describes the life cycle
growth of the  expected  relative  wage or relative  marginal  product  of a fully
mobile worker, that  is, a worker who changes his job  at least  every ki years.
In other words, the first  column is a description  of the  between-jobs  growth
of the relative wage rate  or relative marginal product  with time in the labour
market.  Consequently  it captures  the pure effect of market  experience on the
wage rate  or marginal  productivity.  On the other  hand,  the  diagonal  of the
matrix  is a description  of the within-job  growth of the  relative wage rate  or
relative  marginal  product  with  experience and,  therefore,  captures  the  sum
of the  effect of market  experience  and  the  effect of job-seniority.esting  For
General Skill-Formation
A rising  experience  profile of wages implies that  Ag increases  with  g  at
least initially.  According to existing theory this is indicative of one or more of
three things,  namely, on-the-job general skill formation,  match  improvement
and deferment of compensation  as an insurance, screening or disciplining de-
vice.  However, current  theories  of deferred  compensation  do not  predict  a
rising  profile of relative  marginal  productivity  while both  the job  matching
hypothesis  and  the  theory  of human  capital  do.  Observation  that  both  A 9
and  69 increase  with  g  at  least  initially  is therefore  evidence  that  not  all
the  observed  between-jobs  growth  can be  attributed  entirely  to  deferment
of compensation.  Assuming that  we do have evidence for skill formation  or
job-matching  in this  sense, the question then  arises whether  we can exclude
the  possibility that  the  observed between-jobs  growth in productivity  is en-
tirely  a job-matching  effect.  The  null that  all the  observed  between- jobs
growth of productivity  is a mobility gain can be tested  by comparing  the es-
timated  experience profile of relative  marginal  productivity  with that  of the
relative  wage since on-the-job  search  or matching  cannot,  on  its  own, cre-
ate  a discrepancy  between  spot  wage and  spot  marginal  productivity  while
the  general skill formation  hypothesis  does.  Specifically, we reject  the same
null if we observe that  A 9 < 6.  in the rising  phase of the  profile of marginal
productivity  since the inequality  is consistent  with the implication  of human
capital  theory that  on-the-job  investment  on general skills is wholly financed
by the worker.13
13While  Ag and  6g,  respectively,  are  the  expected  relative  wage and  expected  relative
marginal  product  of a worker  at  experience  level g, we have A 9 < 6.  only if the  expected
absolute  wage of the  worker is less than  his expected  absolute  marginal  product.  Likewise
A 9 =  6g only  if the  expected  absolute  wage  is equal  to  the  expected  absolute  marginal
152.2.1  Testing  For Mobility  Gains
Assume next that  we have observed that  both  Ag  and 69 rise at least initially
and that  A 9 < 6g in the rising phase of the experience profile of marginal pro-
ductivity.  This will leave us with the other extreme possibility  open, namely,
that  there  are  no  productivity  gains  from  mobility  so that  the  observed
between-jobs  growth  in  productivity  should  be  attributed  entirely  to  skill
formation.  One way of testing  this  as a null is to compare  the  between-jobs
experience  profile of marginal  productivity  with  the  corresponding  within-
job  profile, i.e., to  compare  the  first  column entries  of the  profile matrix  of
marginal  productivity  with  the  corresponding  diagonal  entries  of the  same
matrix.  Recall that  the  expected relative  marginal  product  of a non-mobile
worker at experience level g is 696gg  =  1 + /3g  + f3g 9+ b'gg  + bgg. On the other
hand,  69=  1 +,3+gb  so that  6969g-69  =  i3g 9 +bg9 +  -bgO. Since
3gg  + bgŽg  >  0, we have 69699  < 69 only if bg - b 9 > 0, that  is, only if there
is a positive job  mathing  effect.  Consequently,  observation  that  69699  <  69
is evidence that  not  all the observed  between-jobs  growth  of marginal  pro-
ductivity  can  be  attributed  to  skill formation.  Unfortunately,  observation
to  the contrary  that  696gg9  >  69 does not  necessarily  imply the  absence  of a
job  matching  effect since the  same observation  can occur despite  a positive
matching  effect if /3g + bV 9 > bX-  bgg. A more discriminating  test  is to  com-
pare  the  expected  relative  marginal  product  of a fully mobile  worker with
that  of a worker with the  same level of market  experience,  but  in an  inter-
mediate  state  of mobility, that  is, to compare  6g with  6g6gh where  1 < h < g
rather  than  with  69699. This  is because  we expect  ,igh  + bgVh  to  be  smaller
than  /3g + bg1g  for 1 < h < g. We have  g  6gh = Iph  +3g  +  gh
so that  6g6 gh- 6 g  =  0gh +  b-h  +  bg  +  bg  - . Since Igh + bh  Ž0,  this
means that  we observe  6g6gh < 69 only  if bg1  - (bgoh +  bg'h) >  0, i.e., only if
b1 > (bgX + b14h),  which, under  the implication  14 h +  bgh >0  of Topel's search
and  match  technology, means that  bg > 0, i.e., mobility gains  are positive.
product. To see  this we need  only  note that the expected  wage  and the expected  marginal
product of a woker  in the base group are eeo and e0o  respectively.  The expected  wage
rate of  a worker  at experience  level  g and seniority  level  one is e°0+a1g  while  the expected
marginal  product of the same  worker  is eI 30+)g.  Since  the definitions  of Ag  and 89  are
)=  e  and 69=  e  , we have  g = e/ls-
3 Ls  that is, Ag  < 6g  only if 3,g > aig
162.2.2  Testing  For  Specific  Skill  Formation
If the  mobility  gain  b.0 is positive,  so that  bg6gh  <  6g,  we must  also have
'gh  <  1, that  is, the  expected  marginal  product  of a worker  at  experience
level g and  job-seniority  level h,  where  1 <  h  <  g, must  be  less than  the
marginal  product  of a newly  matched  worker at  the  same  level of market
experience.  Note  also that
6  ~~~139"h + e9ah  + bg  +  19h-b  (38) 6gh  =  +  6  (38
h  <  g,g=2,...,G
On the other  hand,  since bg  =  0, we have
6gg  =  1+  (i3;g+b  g  6  )  (39)
g  2,...,G
A rising job-seniority  profile of relative  marginal productivity  means that  6gh
increases with  h initially  and  is non-decreasing  thereafter,  i.e.,
1 >  6g2  <  bgh < 6gg  (40)
for all h:  2 < h < g so that  the series 1,  6i,  *--,  Sgh, ... ,  6gg maps out a U-shape.
In view of equation  2.38, observation 
6 h  <  1 is evidence that  8gh understates
the true  effect of job-seniority  on marginal  productivity  as the  result  of the
mobility  gains,  b0,  at  experience  level g  .This  follows from  the  fact  that
'gh  +  bgh >  0 SO that  the observation  is possible only if b  Oh  + bg  - bg <  0. 9  9  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~gh  g
This  in  turn  is possible  only  if bgO  >  0 under  the  job-matching  hypothesis
that  bgQh  +  bgh  >  0.  In view of equation  2.39, observation  that  6gg  >  1 is
evidence that,  on average, a more senior worker on a job  is more productive,
i.e.,  /3  ++bg 9 >  0, as long as the implication of Topel's match technology that
bg 9 < 0 is valid so that b'  - bX < 0.  Moreover,as  h --+ g, bgh -- +  0 while bg
decreases so that  net mobility gains, bgOh+bgth  and bgqh+bgO  -bd'  both  decrease. g  gh  g  gh  g
A rising job-seniority  profile of marginal productivity  in the sense of equation
7.40 is therefore  evidence that  /gh  +  bglh  rises with  seniority.  It  is of course
possible  that  Ogh=  0 for all g, h:  2 <  h < g so that  none  of the  observed
growth in marginal productivity  can be attributecl  to specific skill formation.
17This  is a null which we can test  by comparing  the  observed job-seniority  of
profile of relative  marginal productivity  with the corresponding job-seniority
profile of relative  wages, that  is, by comparing  the series 1,  692,  ... ,  6gh,  ...  gg
with  the  series  1, Ag2, ... ,  Agh,  ... ,  Agg. First,  if specific skil  formation  or job-
matching  effects  are  the  main  determinants  of  both  Agh  and  6gh  the  job
seniority  profile of relative  wages should also exhibit  the  same U-shape that
the job-seniority  profile relative  marginal productivity  does, since we have
A9h  =  1 +  (ah  +  a  h +  aOh  + a  h  a)
h  <  g,g=2,...,G
corresponding to  equation  2.38 and
A(a  + as6  + as  - ag+
A 99 =  +yg  A 9
h  <  g,9=2,...,G
corresponding  to  2.39.  Given that  both  job-seniority  profiles are U-shaped,
the  null should  be  rejected  if we observe  Agh  >  6gh  in  the  rising  phase  of
seniority  profile of marginal productivity  and  Agh  < Sgh  thereafter,  since this
will be indicative  of the sharing  of the  cost of specific skill formation  by the
firm and the  worker as is the prediction  of the  specific capital  hypothesis.
2.3  Measuring  the  Relative  Magnitudes  of  Skill  For-
mation  and  Mobility  Effects
The joint  estimation  of equations  2.31 and  2.35 thus  enables us to  test  for
both  skill formation  and  mobility  effects even in  a  single  cross-section  of
observations.  However, we need to  estimate  the equations  in first  difference
or  error  component  versions  if we are  to  proceed  beyond  this  and  obtain
an  estimate  of the  magnitude  of either  effect.  Unfortunately  the  sample
size of firms  per  time  period  is too  small  for me to  pursue  this  route  in
this  study.  Instead  I  have taken  advantage  of the  availability  of a  three-
year panel of observations on earnings  and related  characteristics  of workers
randomly  sampled  from  the  firms  for which  equations  2.31 and  2.35 have
been  estimated.  An earnings  function  analysis  of this  additional  piece of
information is useful in two ways. First,  it provides a conventional benchmark
18against  which  results  of estimation  of firm  level average  productivity  and
average wage rate equations can be viewed. Secondly, it can give us some idea
of the magnitude  of mobility effects relative to  the  effect of skill formation,
if and  when the  existence of both  is established  by the  analysis of firm level
productivity  and  wage data.
To see this,  suppose equations  2.1 applies to longitudinal  observations so
that  we should in fact write:
lnwijt = XlijtCes  + X2ijtas2 + Eit  (41)
where
eit  =  OF + ,g +  Vi,t
and distributional  assumptions  about  error components  are as stated  before.
Topel (1991) has proposed a two-step  IV procedure  for obtaining  a consistent
estimate  of a lower bound  for the  true  effect, a8., of job  seniority  on wages
using data  on within-job  growth of earnings.  The first step  of the  procedure
is the  application  of OLS to  the  first  difference of 2.41, which  results  in  a
consistent  estimate,  A  C_ +  ce2, of a',  + a'.  T'he second  step  consists  in
obtaining  IV estimates,  X-,v and  I2v, of a'  and  ce' respectively  by applying
least squares to
ln w-X 2 A  =  X°a'  + X2  a  + a  + el
lnw-XXA  =  -X°a'  +  e2  (42)
with X,  as an instrument  for X°  in the estimation  of each equation.'4 It can
be shown that
E-aIV  =  s +a',+  1 21  (t  + ao)
1 +  1  +  1-aY2  (1  2
E&lV  =  cesa-  a  2  -X 1+  + a+)  (43)
where  Y12 is the coefficient of the regression  of X2 on X1. I will exploit two
features  of Topel's  procedure  for the  purpose  at  hand.  First,  the  procedure
consistently  estimates  the  net  mobility  gain parameter  a'  + a0'.  Secondly,
although  &IV and  cav  are  biased  for their  respective  parameters,  &1v is
14The terms el and e2 are random errors respectively  given  by e'  + X2(A - A) and
ew  + XI (A -A), where, A = a  + a.
19biased up for a'  exactly by the same amount that  &Iv is biased down for a'.
v  ~~~~IV  --IV  -. IV--IV
For given values of aIv and XV  we can calculate A9 g,  A 99 and  Ag A99 as our
estimates  of Ag, A\g and  AgAgg  respectively, which, in view of 7.43, have the
properties
EAgV =1±+es+a±  '+12  (a 9 )  (44)
EA 99 1  l+  c  -a  1-  Y712  (ag +a9 9 )  (4
and
EA9 A9 =1a+±scs  (46)
By using cl  =  -_  - ag + ao 9 instead  of &Iv we can also calculate 1-i12  /  9
an alternative  estimator,  A9,  of Ag  with the  property  that
EA 9 =1  + a  + a  (47)
Clearly,  A7 Ag'  is consistent  for the  sum  of the  true  return  to  market  ex-
perience and  the  true  return  to job-seniority.  Hence it is consistent  for an
upper  bound  of the  true  return  to  market  experience.  It  is also clear  that
-IV 
(Ag  - g)/A12/  - 'Y12) iS  consistent  for a) + aO . Consequently,  the ratio
9 99~  9 of (Ag  - Ag)/(712/1  - 12)  to  Ag  Agg -1  is consistent for the ratio of net
mobility gains,ag + aO , to the sum of the true returns  to  experience and job
seniority, a'  + a'  and,  hence, for a lower bound  of the  ratio  of net mobility
gains to  the  return  to  general skill formation  in the  between-jobs  growth of
wages.  Read  in conjunction  with  the  results  of the  estimation  of equations
2.31 and  2.35,  this  should  give us  some  idea  of the  ratio  of  net  mobility
gains to  the return  to general skill formation  in the between -jobs growth of
marginal productivity  with market  experience.
3  Data  and Results
3.1  Data
The paper is based on the 1993 and 1995 waves of the Addis Ababa  Industrial
Enterprise  Survey  (AAIES). The  1993 wave of the  survey covered a random
selection  of  220 manufacturing  establishements  in  the  the  Adddis  Ababa
20region  of Ethiopia,  of  which  30 were  public  enterprises.  The  1995 wave
revisited  all the public enterprises  and 164 of privately owned firms surveyed
in the  1993 wave and an additional  26 private  firms as replacement  to those
which exited  the  sample  by  1995.  Each  wave involved the  administration
of a written  questionnaire  to enterprise  managers  in several  modules and  a
separate  labour  market  module  to  a random  selection of workers from each
firm. The data  analysed here were drawn from returns  to the production  and
labour market  modules of the questionnaire  to managers  in both  waves, and
the  labour maket  questionnaire  to  workers in the 1995 wave.
It is possible that  most on-the-job skill formation  in firms sampled for the
survey is due to  learning-by-doing.  However, it is' also clear that  both  firms
and workers actively invest in skills through  apprenticeship  programmes  and
post-apprenticeship  training  schemes. Typically, a new recruit  with no prior
work experience joins a firm under  an apprenticeship  programme  lasting  for
about  a year.  For instance,  some 38 per cent  of employees of private  firms
covered in  the  1995 wave had  passed  through  or  were  undergoing  such  a
programme  in  the  present  firm.  Another  22 per  cent  had  done  their  ap-
prenticeship  in other  arms  but  within  the  same industry  (Table  3.1).  The
proportion  of workers who have had  their  apprenticeship  with  the  present
employer  naturally  decreases as we move up  age groups  from  about  47 per
cent  within the  0-5 year experience group  to abouat 30 per cent  for those  16
years  or more of experience.  Correspondingly  the  proportion  of those  who
had  their  apprenticeship  elsewhere in the  same industry  rises with  time  in
the  labour market  from about  11 per  cent for the  0-5 year experience group
to less than  29 per cent for those with  16 years or more of market  experience.
At the  time  of the  1993 wave, about  13 per  cent of workers in private  firms
were undergoing  post-apprenticeship  on-the-job  training.  The  incidence  of
current on-the-job  training  decreases with age from 20 per cent for those with
five years or less of time  in the labour  market  to  about  8 per cent  for those
with  16 years or more of market  experience.
The  survey  also shows that  employers and  workers use a variety  of for-
mal  and informal  channels to  gather  and  disseminate  information  in the job
matching  process.  By formal channels  I mean  oflicial advertisement  of jobs
and  the  registration  of vacancies and  workers'  availability  through  employ-
ment  agencies.  Employers  are resorting  to informnal  channels  when they use
'business  associates',  current  employees  or  'friends  and  relatives'  as  infor-
mants or referees.  Door-to-door  inquiry for vacancies and  the use of friends
or relatives  as sources of information on the same are all instances  of the  use
21Table  1: On-the-job  Active Training,  Private  Sector Workers, AAIES,  1993.
Market Experience in years  All workers
0-5  6-10  11-15  16 +
Per cent of workers
who have had
whohapprentshi  with  46.7  40.5  42.6  29.8  37.9 apprenticeship with
the current employer
Per cent of workers
who have had
apprenticeship in  10.8  18.2  24.2  28.6  21.6
another firm in the
same industry
Per cent of workers
who are being  20.1  15.9  13.4  7.6  13.5
trained in the
the current firm
Number of workers  213  245  194  340  992
of informal channels by job seekers.  Although the range of available channels
is thus  similar  to  that  found in the  developed world, the  survey  also shows
that  the use of formal channels in Ethiopia is restricted  almost entirely to the
public sector.  This  can be seen from Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Asked to specify the
most  common way of finding new workers, less than  5 per  cent of privately
owned firms covered in the  1993 wave cited official advertising  or the  use of
employment  agencies against  a corresponding figure of 93 per cent for public
enterprises  (Table 3.2).  About 55 per cent of private firms identified relatives,
friends or business associates as the most  common source of information  on
new workers while another  36 per  cent identified  current  employees as  the
most  common source.  In response to  the  question  as to  how a worker first
came to know about his/her  current job, less than 4 per cent of private  secotr
workers in 1995 sample  cited formal channels against  a corresponding  figure
of 88 per  cent for public enterprise  employees. About  43 per  cent of private
sector workers said that  they first heard about  the current  job from own rel-
atives or friends.  Another  21 per  cent were tipped  off by friends or relatives
of the owner of the  firm.  Some 32 per  cent  discovered the job  in the course
of door-to-door  search  or heard  about  it  'by  word of mouth'.  In  contrast,
22Table 2: Distribution  of Firms  by the  Most Common Way of Finding  Work-
ers, AAIES,  1993
Most common way of find-  Private Firms  Public Enterprises
ing workers
Number  %  Number  %
Relatives, friends or asso-  102  54.8  - -
ciates of the owner
Employees  66  35.5  2  6.6
Official advertisement  6  3.2  12  40.0
Employment Office  2  1.1  16  53.4
Other  10  5.4  - -
Total  186  100.0  30  100.0
informal channels provided first information on the current  job for only 7 per
cent of public  sector workers. The figure for the proportion  of private  sector
job  seekers who use formal channels  is extremely  low compared  to  what  is
observed in developed  economies.  For instance,  a survey of search methods
by unemployed youth  in the  United  States  in the  early  1980s revealed that
about  58 per  cent of them  consulted  newspaper  ads while 54 per  cent  used
public employment  agencies (Holzer, 1988). On the other  hand,  it should be
noted that  the same US survey also showed that  the proportion  of job seekers
who used informal  sources was also almost  as high  as the  Ethiopian  figure
for job-seekers in the private  sector:  some 85 per cent of the US respondents
reported  to  have used friends or relatives as sources of information.
Equations  2.31 and  2.35 were estimated  on the basis of 345 observations
on privately owned establishments  pooled from the two waves. A firm was in-
cluded in this sample only if it met two criteria,  namely, that  it was privately
owned and that  complete  observations  were available  on the  firm from the
1995 wave. This meant  that  a 1993 observation was included  in the pool only
if it was complete and  related  to  a privately  owned firm on which complete
observations were available from the 1995 wave.  Public enterprises  have been
excluded from the sample analysed  here because of the  evidence that  public
sector jobs  in Ethiopia  are rationed  and the  apparent  difference in the job-
matching  process between the public and  private  sectors.  Earnings  function
estimates  are based  on observations  on 1448 of the  workers covered by the
1995 wave. The sample selection criterion used here was that  an observation
23Table 3:  Distribution  of Sample Workers  by Source of First  Piece  of Infro-
mation  About  the  Current  Job, AAIES,  1995-wave.
How  did  you  first  hear  Private sector workers  Public sector workers
about your current job?
Number  Per cent  Number  Per cent
From relatives or friends of  576  42.5  7  2.3
mine
From relatives or friends of  279  20.6  - -
the firm owner
By word of mouth  223  16.5  15  5.0
I went door to door  207  15.3  9  3.0
Through  an  official  39  2.9  44  14.7
advertisement
Through the Employment  3  0.2  219  73
Office
Other  27  0.2  219  73.0
Total  1354  100.0  300  100.0
related  only to  a worker who had  been continuously  employed  for at  least
three  years by 1995 in a firm belonging to the sample used to estimate  equa-
tions  2.31 and  2.35. The requirement  of a minimum of three-year  continuous
employment on the same job is the only way of ensuring  that  earnings func-
tion estimates  are not contaminated  by earnings data  from past  employment
in  firms outside  of the  sample  used to  estimate  the  productivity  and  wage
equations.
For the  purpose  of estimation,  equation  2.35 has been augmented  to  in-
clude dummy variables  as controls for variation  in year of observation,  com-
position  of work force by level of schooling, gender composition  of the  work
force, employment size of the firm, age of the firm, average age of equipment,
main  method  of production  and  industry.  With  the  exception  of those  re-
lating  to the age of the  firm and the average age of its  equipment,  the same
dummy variables also figure in the estimated  version of equation  2.31. Defin-
itions of these and basic variables of the two equations  are given in Table 3.5
along with  descriptive  statistics.  Output,  wage and  capital  stock figures for
1993-observations were all expressed  at  1995 prices using  the  Addis Ababa
Retail  Price Index  before pooling observations  across the  two waves of the
24Table  4:  Mean  and  Standard  Deviations  of Shares of Experience-Seniority
Cells in Annual  Labour  Input.
(Standard  deviations  in parentheses)
Experience  Job Seniority ( years)  Row
(years)  0-5  6-10  11-15  16+  sum
0-5  0.1821  0.1821
(0.2271)
6-10  0.1840  0.0642  0.2482
(0.2161)  (0.1131)
11-15  0.1044  0.0411  0.0262  0.1717
(0.1570)  (0.0864)  (0.0796)
16+  0.1776  0.0643  0.0429  0.1102  0.3950
(0.2211)  (0.1140)  (0.0961)  (0.2184)
Col. sum  0.6481  0.1696  0.0691  0.1102
survey.  Output  is defined as annual production  less the value of intermediate
inputs  and utility charges.  The corresponding annual capital  input  is proxied
by the estimated  current  sales value of equipment  at 1995 prices. Time in the
labour  market  or potential  experience  is measured  as age expressed  to  the
nearest  year minus years  of schooling minus  six.  Job  seniority  is measured
as the nearest  full number of continuous years of employment  in the  current
firm.  Experience-seniority  cells of the  work force of a  firm are  defined  in
terms  of four levels or year intervals,  namely, 5 years  or less, 6 to  10 years,
11 to  15 years and  16 years  or over.  The base  cell consists  of workers with
5 years or less of potential  market  experience.  The  share  of an  experience-
seniority cell of workers in the annual  input  of labour  in a firm is defined as
the  ratio  of annual  hours of workers in the  cell to  total  annual  hours of all
workers in the  firm.  Descriptive  statistics  for sha,res of individual  cells are
given in Table 3.4.
Table 3.6 gives descriptive statistics  and definitions of variables used in the
estimation  of earnings functions.  Earnings function estimates  in levels refer to
1994 and 1995 observations for workers employed continuously  in the current
firm for at least  the  past  three  years.  Earnings  fimction  estimates  in first
difference are based on the difference between 1995 hourly wages for the same
workers and their  1994 hourly wages, the latter  having first been expressed at
1995 prices.  The control dummies used in the estinmation  of earning functions
25Table 5: Descriptive  Statistics  For Variables In Firm  Level Productivity  and
Wage Equations
Variable  Variable Definition  Mean  S.D
WAGE  Log wage bill per man hour  0.4891  1.1796
OUTPUT  Log output per man hour  1.2589  1.2091
CAPITAL  Log capital stock per man hour  1.6570  1.6646
HOURS  Log annual hours  10.13  0.9494
SIZE2  Dummy=1 if employment size is 11-20  workers  0.21  0.41
SIZE3  Dummy=1 if employment size is 21-50  workers  0.16  0.36
SIZE4  Dummy=1 if employment size is 51-100  workers  0.06  0.25
SIZE5  Dummy=1 if employment size is more than  100  0.04  0.12
AGE2  Dummy=1 if the age of the frim is 5-10 years  0.13  0.33
AGE3  Dummy=1 if the age of the firm is 11-20 years  0.28  0.45
AGE4  Dummy=1 if the age of the firm is more than 20 years  0.26  0.44
EQAGE2  Dummy=1 if the average age of equipment is 6-10 years  0.21  0.41
EQAGE3  Dummy=1 if the average age of equipment is 11-15 years  0.15  0.36
EQAGE4  Dummy=1 if the mean age of equipment exceeds 15 yrs  0.21  0.41
CRAFT  Dummy=1 if the main method of production is craft work.  0.18  0.39
BATCH  Dummy=1 if the main method of production is batch mode.  0.08  0.28
TEAM  Dummy=1 if the main method of production is team work  0.31  0.47
DPRIM  Dummy=1 if more than 90% of employees have completed  0.72  0.45
primary school
DSEC  Dummy=1 if more than  58% of employees have completed  0.47  0.50
secondary school
DVOC  Dummy=1 if the firm employs at least one graduate  of a  0.13  0.34
vocational college
PROFEM2  Dummy=1 if a tenth to a quarter of employees  are female  0.29  0.45
PROFEM3  Dummy=1 if a quarter to a half of employees are female  0.33  0.47
PROFEM4  Dummy=1 if more than half of employees are female  0.11  0.32
1995  Dummy=1 for a 1995 observation  053  0.50
TEXT  Dummy=1 for textiles firms  0.07  0.25
GARM  Dummy=1 for garment producing firms  0.16  0.37
KNIT  Dummy=1 for knitwear producer  0.12  0.33
LEATH  Dummy=1 for leather products  0.15  0.36
WOOD  Dummy=1 for furniture and wood workd  0.12  0.33
26Table 6: Descriptive  Statistics  For Variables in Earnings  Functions
Variables  Definition  Mean  SID
LNRWAGE  Log hourly wage at 1995 prices  0.40770  0.7818
ALNRWAGE  Annual change in LNRVVAGE  0.0047  0.2418
EXPR  Potential market experience in years  18.698  14.402
EXPRSQ/102  EXPR squared/102 5.569  8.587
EXPRCB/103 EXPR cubed/103 21.720  46.945
EXPRQR/104 EXPR  raised to  the  4th power/104 98.835  283.565
TENURE  Number of years on the current job  8.587  7.975
TENURESQ/102  TENURE squared/102  1.376  2.778
TENURECB/103 TENURE cubed/103 3.258  10.428
TENUREQR/104 TENURE raised to the 4th power/104 95.969  43.299
AEXPRSQ/102 annual change in EXPRSQ/102 0.403  0.373
AEXPRCB/103 annual change in EXPRCB/103 1.693  2.495
LEXPRQR/10 4 annual  change in EXPRQR/10 4 8.547  18.376
ATENURESQ/102 annual change in TENURESQ/10 2 0.166  0.160
ATENURECB/103 annual change in TENURECB/103 0.398  0.814
ATENUREQR/ 104  annual change in TENUREQR/104 1.254  4.025
EDUC1  Dummy=1 if highest level of education completed is primary  0.36  0.48
EDUC2  Dummy=1 if highest level of education completed is secondary  0.38  0.49
EDUC3  Dummy=1 if have had tertiary education  0.10  0.10
SIZE295  Dummy=1 for employer size in 1995 was 11-20  workers  0.22  0.41
SIZE395  Dummy=1 if employer size in 1995 was 21-50 workers  0.26  0.44
SIZE495  Dummy=1 if employer size in 1995 was 51-100  workers  0.27  0.44
SIZE595  Dummyr=1  if employer size in 1995  was more than 100 workers  0.16  0.37
FEMALE  Dummy=1 if female  0.23  0.42
27in levels relate to  schooling, gender, industry  and  employment  size.
3.2  Results
3.2.1  Profile  Matrices  of Relative  Marginal  Productivity  and  Rel-
ative  Wages
Non-linear  SUR  estimates  of the  firm level average productivity  and  wage
rate  equations  are reported  in Table 3.7.  The productivity  equation  is esti-
mated  based  on the  Cobb-Douglas  specification.  Parameters  of the  relative
marginal productivity  equation  can be derived and estimated  for any flexible
specification  of the  production  function  of the  firm including  the  translog.
However, based  on the  estimation  of the  equivalent  of equation  2.35 under
the  translog  specification,  a  Wald  test  could  not  reject  the  Cobb-Douglas
restrictions  at  a reasonable  level of significance (p-value=0.4214).  Estimates
of coefficients of control variables, namely, year of observation,  schooling, in-
dustry, firm size, firm age, average age of equipment  and mode of production
are reported  in the  Appendix.  In Tables 3.8 and  3.9, I report  the experience-
seniority profile matrices of relative marginal productivity  and relative wages
as read from Table  3.7. P-values  of Wald tests  of within  and  cross-equation
restrictions  of interest  relating  to  the  profiles of marginal  productivity  and
wages are reported  in Table 3.10.
In Table 3.8, each element is an estimate  of the  expected  wage rate  of a
worker of a given level of market  experience and a given level of job  seniority
relative  to  the expected  wage rate  of a worker in the base  group,  that  is, a
worker for whom market  experience is five years at most.  The corresponding
entry in Table 3.9 estimates the expected marginal product  of a worker in the
same experience-seniority  group relative to the expected  marginal product  of
a worker in the base group.  In either table,  a column shows how the expected
relative marginal  product  or relative wage changes as market  experience rises
from one 5-year level to the next  assuming that  job seniority  is always fixed
at  some  5-year level.  A row describes how the  expected  relative  marginal
product  or the expected relative wage changes as job-seniority  increases from
one 5-year level to the next but, this time, assuming that  market  experience is
fixed at some 5-year level. The first column maps out the estimated  between-
jobs  experience  profile of expected  relative  marginal  productivity  or wages
for a fully mobile  worker, that  is, a worker who changes jobs  at least  once
every five years.  Diagonal  elements  estimate  the  corresponding  within-job
28Table 7: Non-linear  SUR Estimates  of the Structtural Parameters  of the Av-
erage  Wage and  Average Producitvity  Equations.
Average Hourly  Average Hourly
Wage Equation  Productivity Equation
Base Relative Wage, Ag,
or Relative Marginal Product,  6g,
Experience level:  6-10 years  1.3203  1.6486
(0.32899)  (0.44986)
11-15 years  1.3568  2.2532
(0.32106)  (0.46532)
16 years or more  1.7545  1.7882
(0.458,69)  (0.58717)
Relative Wage, Agh,  or Relative
Marginal Product,  6gh, of Seniority Groups
Experience 6-10 years
Seniority Level
6-10 years  0.7830  0.8107
(0.66027)  (0.73586)
Experience 11-15  years
Seniority Level
6-10 years  0.7744  0.2605
(0.53457)  (0.34611)
11-15  years  1.7128  1.0696
(0.80443)  (0.65347)
Experience 16 years or more
Seniority Level
6-10 years  0.8950  -0.0829
(0.58958)  (0.54117)
11-15 years  1.1317  0.2663
(0.94720)  (0.57673)






Constant  -0.4602  1.4087
(0.33772)  (1.0019)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 29Table 8: Estimated  Experience-Seniority  Profile Matrix  of Relative  Wages
LEVELS OF JOB SENIORITY
AgAgh
EXPERIENCE:  5 years or less (Ag)  6-10 years  11-15 years  16 years or more
5 years or less  1.0000
6-10 years  1.3203  1.0338
(0.32899)  (0.79645)
11-15  years  1.3568  1.0508  2.3240
(0.32106)  (0.67289)  (0.9495)
16 years or more  1.7545  1.5702  1.9856  2.4252
1 (0.45869)  (0.9464)  (1.5454)  (0.6246)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
growth since they  refer to a non-mobile worker, i.e., a worker who has never
changed his job  since his first five years in the labour  market.  Off diagonal
elements other  than  those  in the first  column estimate  the  expected  relative
marginal  product  or wage of a worker in an  intermediate  state  of mobility,
that  is, a worker who does change jobs but  less frequently  than  at least once
every five years.
It is clear from Table 3.8 that  there  is substantial  between-jobs growth in
wages as market  experience increases and the null of a flat experience profile
of wages is rejected  for fully mobile workers (Table 3.10).  For instance,  the
expected  wage rate  of a fully mobile worker with  11 to  15 years  of market
experience  is 35 per  cent higher than  the  expected  rate  of a worker in the
base  group  while the  expected  wage rate  of a  worker with  a  minimum  of
16 years  of experience  is 75 per  cent  higher than  the  base.  Evidence  that
at  least  a part  of this  growth  in wages with  experience  is the  return  to on-
the-job  skill formation  or match  improvement  through  mobility  is provided
by  the  first  column  of Table  3.9,  from  which  we read  that  the  expected
relative marginal product  of a fully mobile worker also grows with  experience
albeit  at a decreasing  rate.  The null of a flat experience  profile of marginal
productivity  is also rejected  for the such a worker even more easily than  the
null that  the  experience  profile of his wage rate  is flat  (Table 3.10).  Notice
also that  marginal  productivity  grows faster than  the wage rate  for a fully
30Table 9:  Estimated  Experience-  Seniority  Profile of Relative  Marginal  Pro-
ductivity.




EXPERIENCE:  5 years or less (6g)  6-10 years  11-15 years  16 years or more
5 years or less  1.0000
6-10 years  1.6486  1.3366
(0.44986)  (1.0953)
11-15  years  2.2532  0.5870  2.4100
(0.46532)  (0.7645)  (1.3722)
16 years or more  1.7882  -0.1483  0.4763  2.7525
1 (0.58717)  (0.96991)  (1.0204)  (0.96026)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
mobile  worker.  Thus,  as market  experience  increases  from  5 to  10 years,
expected marginal  productivity  grows to  65 per cent higher than  the base.  A
further  five year increase in experience more than  cLoubles  expected  marginal
productivity  relative  to  the base.  Marginal productivity  falls as experience
increases  from  then  onwards.  However, the  expected  marginal  product  of
a  fully mobile  worker  with  at  least  16 years  of market  experience  is  still
nearly  80 per  cent higher than  the  base.  It is not  surprising,  therefore,  that
the  null that  the  experience  profile of marginal  product  is identical  to  the
corresponding  wage profile is easily rejected for a fully mobile worker (Table
3.10).  This is evidence that  at least some of the observed between-jobs growth
in  marginal  productivity  is the  return  to  general  skill formation,  since the
test  outcome is primarily  a consequence of a worker with  15 years  or less of
experience  being paid less than  marginal  product  while there  is no evidence
that  6o is different from Ag  for older workers. On the other hand, the null that
mobility  gains have nothing to  do with the observed between-jobs  growth in
marginal  productivity  is also rejected.  Estimates  of 632,  642  and  643  are all
significantly  less than  unity  (Table  3.7)  as  a  result  of which  the  estimate
Of 63632  is significantly  smaller than  that  of 63  while estimates  of 64642  and
64643  are both  significantly smaller than  that  of 841  (Table  3.9).  The overall
conclusion to  be  drawn  from the  estimated  experience  profiles of marginal
31Table  10: P-Values  of Wald Tests  of Restrictions  on Marginal  Product  and
Wage Profiles.
Restriction  P-value
Flat experience profile of the wage rate,
i.e., Ag =  1, g  =  2,3,4  0.02247
Flat experience profile of marginal product,
i.e., tg  = 1 ,l g =  2,3,4  0.00011
Identical experience and seniority profiles
of marginal product and the wage rate, i.e.,
Ag =  6  ,,  g =  2,3,4  0.00362
Flat job-seniority profiles of the wage rate,
i.e., A9h =  1,  2 < h < g, g = 2,3,4  0.85735
Flat job-seniority profiles of marginal product,
i.e., £gh =  1,  2 <  h < g, g = 2,3,4  0.00001
Identical job seniority profiles
of marginal product and the wage rate,
Agh =  gh I h < g, g ==  2, 3,4  0.08357
Flat experience and seniority profile of the wage rate
i.e., AgAgh =  1,  2 <  h  < g, g =  2,3,4  0.03679
Flat experience and seniority profile of marginal
product, i.e.,
6 9 6gh  =  1l,2  < h < g, g  =  2,3,4  0.05499
Equality of Relative Wages  and Relative Marginal
product,  i.e.,  AgAgh =  tg 6 gh  0.03011
32productivity  and  wages for  a  fully mobile  worker is  then  two-fold.  First,
there  is evidence that  at  least  a  part  of the  observed  between-jobs  growth
of wages is due to  between-jobs growth in marginal productivity  and,  hence,
must  be  regarded  as the  result  of match  improve:ment or return  to  on-the-
job skill formation.  Secondly, the observed between-jobs  growth in marginal
productivity  is in part  due to on -the-job  skill forraation  and  in part  reflects
the improvement  match  through  mobility.
The fact that  6gh  <  1 whenever h < g, as estimates  in Table 3.7 indicate,
means that  job-matching  effects are a significant influence in-the job-seniority
profile of marginal  productivity.  However, such effects are by no means the
only determinant  of the  profile. As can be seen from the same table,  the null
Egg  =  1 cannot  be  rejected  for any  value of g.  However, the  estimated  job-
seniority profile of marginal  productivity  is rising  at each level of experience
from seniority  level two onwards, that  is, the  estimate  of 
6 gh  increases with
h provided h > 2. Since job-match  effects do not  increase with  seniority this
can only be evidence that  more senior workers have greater  endowment either
of firm specific capital  or of unobserved  ability.  In  principle  the  rise in the
job-seniority  profile of marginal  productivity  may  not  have anything  to  do
with  specific skill formation.  However, two observations  suggest  otherwise.
First,  although  the  null  of a  flat  job-seniority  profile of the  relative  wage
cannot  be  rejected  (Table  3.10), the  estimated  profile follows the  same U-
shape  as the  seniority  profile  of relative  marginaLl  productivity.  Secondly,
the  null that  the two profiles are identical  is rejected  (Table 3.10) essentially
because 
5gh  <  Agh  whenever h < g for g, h >  2, which is consistent  with  the
financing  implications  of the specific skill formation  hypothesis.
3.2.2  The  Earnings  Function  Evidence
The  picture  emerging  from the  results  of the  estimation  of the  experience-
seniority  profiles of relative  marginal  productivity  and  the  relative  wage is
thus  one in which both  on-the-job  skill formation  and job-matching  are sig-
nificant sources  of the  growth  of wages with  market  experience  and job  se-
niority.  In Tables  3.11 to  3.13, I present  results  of the analysis  of individual
level earnings  data  with  the  aim of forming some idea of the  magnitude  of
job-matching  effects relative  to  returns  to  skill formation  in  the  observed
between  -jobs growth  of marginal  productivity.  Ordinary  least  squares  pa-
rameter  estimates  of alternative  specifications  of the earnings  function  as a
quadratic  and  as a quartic  are given in Table 3.11.  The standard  quadratic
33specification is rejected  at the 5 per  cent level in favour of the  quartic,  which
is regarded  to  be superior  to  the  quadratic  in that  it largely  eliminates  the
tendency  of the quadratic  to understate  earnings growth for younger workers
while overstating  it for those  in the middle  age group  (Murphy  and  Welch,
1990).'5 Results  of the first step of Topel's two-step IV estimator  as reported
in Table 3.12 are therefore  based on the  quartic  specification.  A comparison
of the  main  'effects'  of experience  and job-seniority  as read  from  the  same
table  with  the corresponding  OLS parameter  estimates  of the quartic  speci-
fication in Table  3.11 shows that  the latter  are very much biased up for the
true  return  to  seniority  as a result  of the  correlation  of unobserved  ability
with job  tenure.  By removing  this  bias the  first  differencing leading  to the
specification underlying  Table 3.12 brings the estimate  of the sum of the true
returns  to  experience and  seniority-i.e., of a-' + a2-  for a new entrant  to the
labour  market  down from nearly  13 per  cent a year to just  over 8 per  cent
per year.
Results  of the  second  step  of Topel's  procedure  are reported  in  Table
3.13. The first  column of this  table  is the constant  term  of the specification
estimated  in  Table  3.12.  The  second  and  third  column  are  estimates  of
the coecoefficients of XI  and  -Xli  obtained  by applying  least  squares  to
the  first  and  second  equations,  respectively,  of 3.42 extended  to  the  case
of a  full quartic  specification  and  to  include  the  usual  control  variables  of
schooling, gender,  industry  and  employer  size." 6 The  fourth  column  is the
estimate  of the  coefficient of X2 in the  estimation  of the  extended  form of
the  first  equation  of 3.42.  The  first  column  entry  tells  us  that,  once we
remove mobility  gains  and  returns  to  unobserved  ability,  the  hourly  wage
of a  new  entrant  to  the  labour  market  will  grow on  the  average  by just
8 per  cent  during  the  first  year  as the  sum  of the  true  returns  to  market
experience  and  job  seniority.  The  entry  of the  third  column  then  tells  us
" 5 Using  US data,  Murphy  and  Welch  find  that  the  quadratic  specifcation  'undestates
early  career  earnings  growth  by about  30-50 per  cent and  midcareer  growth  by 20-50 per
cent'.  They also find that  the  quartic  specification  reduces  this  'bias'  by more than  90 per
cent while the  cubic specfication  reduces it by 75 per  cent.
'6Thus,  in place of the  first  equation  of 2.42, I estimate  nw  - Xlf  = Xla'  +X2(a"  +
2a4)  + Z7 + el,  where  Z  is a vector  of control  variables,  -y is the  vector  of coefficients of
the same,  X1 =  (X 1,  \X12,  AX3, AX1, AX22,  AX2,  AX24) and P  is the  vector  of coefficient
estimates  reported  in Table 3.8.  Likewise, in place of the second equation  of 2.42, I estimate
ln w -X2r  =  -Xi°ao  +Z^y + e2, where X2 has the  same elements  as X1 with  the  exception
of its  first element which  is X2. In either  case XO is instrumented  by  X1 .
34Table  11:  Ordinary  Least  Squares  Estimates  of Earnings  Function  Para-
mentes.
Dependent  Variable=  LNRWAGE
Variable  Quadratic  Quartic
Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error
EXPR  0.044538  0.0037852  0.026903  0.0164420
EXPRSQ  -0.0006806  0.0000614  0.0008287  0.0010000
EXPRCB  -0.0000421  0.0000227
EXPR.QR  0.0000004  0.0000002
TENURE  0.031009  0.0057548  0.0968890  0.0234140
TENURESQ  -0.0003587  0.0001578  -0.0073473  0.0022227
TENURECB  0.0002527  0.0000774
TENUREQR  -0.0000028  0.0000009
EDUC1  0.17180  0.042047  0.16327  0.042384
EDUC2  0.61613  0.045326  0.61406  0.045491
EDUC3  1.3892  0.069187  1.3828  0.069312
FEMALE  0.27134  0.030667  -0.2713  0.030584
YEAR95  0.11646  0.025405  0.12432  0.025557
SIZE295  -0.13436  0.067478  -0.12872  0.067392
SIZE395  -0.19716  0.066079  -0.18315  0.066148
SIZE495  -0.02115  0.072875  -0.01002  0.067868
SIZE595  0.11956  0.041081  0.13674  0.07311
constant  -0.92294  0.064719  -1.0303  0.10192
-2  0.47  0.48
Number of Observations  2896  2896
35Table  12: Estimates  of Parameters  of Within-Job  Wage Growth.
Dependent variable=ALNRWAGE
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error
contant  0.082452  0.01786
AEXPRSQ  -0.0009394  0.000503
AEXPRCB  -0.0000066  0.00002
AEXPRQR  0.0000001  0.0000002
ATENURESQ  -0.0057391  0.0025158
ATENURECB  0.0002225  0.0001025
ATENUREQR  -0.0000026  0.0000012
R  0.03
Number of Observations  1448
Table  13:  Two-step  IV Estimates  of First  Order  Effects of Job-matching,
Experience  and  Job  Seniority on Within-Job  Wage Growth.
PARAMETERS
01  +O2  °1  °2  a1  + 
ESTIMATE  0.082452  0.06971  0.012753  0.036001
(0.01786)  (0.00239)  (0.0023851)  (0.0021262)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
that  at  least  15 per  cent  of this  within-job  growth  in  wages  is return  to
job-seniority  leaving the  balance  as the maximum  possible annual  return  to
market  experience.  This  is consistent  with  the evidence, reported  in earlier
sections,  in  favour  of specific skill  formation  being  a  source  of within-job
wage growth.  However, the magnitude  of the estimate  also suggests that  the
true  return  to job-seniority  in general and,  hence, the return  to  specific skill
formation  in  particular,  may well account  for  a very  small  fraction  of the
observed within-job  wage growth.
The entry of the last column of Table 3.13 consistently  estimates  the net
gain to mobility, a±+ao,  at the end of the first year.  It tells us that  the hourly
wage of a new entrant  to the labour market  would grow on the average by 3.6
per  cent at the end of the first year purely as a result  of match  improvement
36Table  14:  Earnings  Function  Estimates  of Return  to  Skill Formation  and
Mobility Gains by Level  of Market Experience.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
IV  _IV-IV  Iv--------
A  A  A  A  a,  4a
9 A  ag + a  = 99 (4)/ [(2)-1]
Level of Experience:  _
5 years or less  1.0000
6-10 years  1.3740  1.1642  1.1555  0.3103  1.89
(0.04657)  (0.18268)  (0.04076)
11-15  years  1.7454  1.1815  1.2929  0.6405  3.53
(0.14453)  (0.4279)  (0.1114)
16 years or more  2.7201  1.8401  1.1522  2.2192  2.64
(1.2071)  (0.2937)  (0.5321)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
through  mobility,  i.e., as return  to  the  growth  in the  information  available
to  the worker regarding  prospective  job  matches.  This  is a very high  figure
compared  to  the  estimate  of the  sum of the  true  returns  to  experience  and
job-seniority  for a non-mobile worker as reported  in the  first  column  of the
table.  Indeed  the  ratio  of net  mobility  gain to  the  sum of the  true  returns
to  experience and  seniority  grows dramatically  beyond  the first five years of
time  in the  labour market  to  a point where mobility gains  are the dominant
source of between-jobs wage growth.  This is what is read in Table 3.14. In the
first and second columns of this table,  I have used the values of  -a'v and cv,
as reported  in Table  3.13, and  estimates  of coefficients of changes in second
and higher powers of X,  and  X2, as reported  in Table 3.12, to calculate  AI 9
_IV-'IV
and  A  Ag . The  base  wage relative  to  which  these  measure  between-jobs
and  within-job  growth  at  experience level g is the  hourly  wage of a worker
at  2.75 years  of time  in  the  labour  market  and  2.75 years  of time  on the
current job,  2.75 being the mid point  of the base interval of 0 to  5.5 years.' 7
'7Since A-  is biased up for the expected relative wage, it is not surprising that figures
37Values of A 9 are reported in the third  column of the table.  Entries in the
fourth column of the Table are estimates of net mobility gains at experience
level g, obtained by subtracting third column entries from the corresponding
entries in the first column and dividing by 0.7065  which the estimated value
Of  'Y12/(l  - ^Y12)- In the last column I express entries of the fourth column as
ratios of Ag Agg  - 1. As pointed out earlier, each ratio consistently estimates
a lower bound to the magnitude of net mobility gains to the return to skill
formation at  a given level of experience level g.  The figures range from
1.89 for workers in the experience range of 5-10 years to 3.53 for workers in
the experience range of 10-15 years. Thus, while estimates of the firm level
average productivity and wage equations show that both mobility gains and
general skill formation are significant influences  in the between-jobs growth
of wages and productivity, the  earning function evidence is that  mobility
gains are by far the more important of the two sources.
4  Summary  and  Conclusion
In what I believe  is the first attempt at simultaneous  testing of the skill forma-
tion and job-matching hypotheses of wage  growth, this chapter has analysed
production and labour market data  from a random selection of small and
medium sized manufacturing firms in Ethiopia. The key step in the analysis
is the joint regression  of the log of the average productivity of hours in the
firm and the log of the average  hourly earnings of its employees  on the rela-
tive shares of experience-seniority  categories  of the work force in total hours
in the firm. The value of this as a technique is that it generates experience-
seniority profile matrices of marginal productivity and wages on which the
skill formation and job-matching hypotheses  impose well  known restrictions.
According  to the test result reported in the chapter, both skill formation and
job-matching produce significant between-jobs growth of marginal produc-
tivity with market experience,  which must account for at least a part of the
observed between-jobs growth of wages with experience. However, an earn-
ings function analysis of data on workers sampled from the firms and period
in the first column of the table are much higher than  the corresponding entries in Table
3.8.  It is not surprising either that  figures of the second column ot the table are much
lower than  the corresponding figures for within-job growth as read from Table 3.8 since
the latter are baised up for the sum of the true returns to experience and seniority while
A9 Agg  is not.
38for which  the  productivity  and  wage profile matrices  were  estimated  leads
to the conclusion that  job-matching  is by far the more important  of the two
sources:  net mobility gains account  for at least twice the  share of the return
to skill formation  in the observed between-jobs groawth  of wages with market
experience.  This  figure is extremely  high compared  to  the  figure of 0.5 re-
ported by Topel and Ward (1992) for US workers with  10 years or less of time
in the labour  market,  and even higher than  those  suggested  for US workers
in the same age group by Mincer and  Jovanovic (1981) and  Bartel  and Bor-
jas  (1981).  Although  the rate  of return  to  formation  is much higher  for US
workers than  workers in Ethiopia,  the US rate  of return  to skill formation  as
reported,  for example, by Topel (1991) is at most 50 per cent higher than  the
figures I calculate  for my sample of workers. I, therefore,  conclude that  the
higher ratio  of mobility gains to the  return  to  skill formation  for Ethiopia  is
in part  a reflection  of higher scarcity  value of labour  market  information  for
workers in Ethiopia,  which should not  be surprising  in view of the  evidence,
reported  in section 3.3.1, that  the flow of labour market  information  is much
more restricted  in Ethiopia.
Tests  of the  skill  formation  hypothesis  have  to  date  been  overwhelm-
ingly dominated  by earnings function  analysis (e.g., Haley, 1976; Lillard and
Weiss, 1979; Hause,  1981; Neumark  and  Taubman,  1995; and  Baker,  1997)
as have been those of the job-matching  hypothesis  (e.g.  Flinn,  1986; Altonji
and  Shakoto,  1987; Marshal  and  Zarkin,  1987; Farber  and  Abraham,  1987;
Garen,  1989; Topel,  1988, 1991; and  Topel and  Ward,  1992).  Indeed,  I am
aware only of three  studies  in  which data  on workers'  productivity  are di-
rectly analysed in testing  models of wage determination,  namely, Medoff and
Abraham  (1980), Blackmore  and Hoffman  (1989) and Hellerstein  and  Neu-
mark  (1995).  The Medoff and  Abraham  study  comnpared  employee earnings
in two large US  manufacturing  corporations  with  supervisors'  performance
evaluation  data  to conclude that  on-the-job skill formation  could not  explain
'a  substantial  part  of the  observed return  to labour  market  experience'.  In
spite  of the  acknowledged  limitation  of performance  evaluation  scores as a
proxy for productivity,  this  result remains  the only direct  evidence in favour
of alternatives  to  the  human  capital  explanation  of a rising experience  pro-
file of earnings.  The  study  by  Blackmore  and  Hoffman  went  beyond  the
case study  scope of the  Meddof and  Abraham  paper  in analysing  aggregate
time  series  productivity  and  earnings  data  on  the  US  manufacturing  sec-
tor  as  a whole.  However, it  was concerned  exclusively  with  the  influence
of job-seniority  on  productivity  and  wages.  Its  results  were  therefore  not
39comparable  with  those  of the  Medoff and  Abraham  paper.  The  Hellerstein
and  Neumark  paper  was a significant step  forward in terms  of direct  use of
observations  on productivity  by using firm level data  and  was, indeed,  the
first attempt  at the joint  estimation  of marginal  productivity  and wage pro-
files as the  basis  for testing  the  skill formation  hypothesis.  Unfortunately
the  authors  focused on age profiles to the  exclusion of job-seniority  profiles
without  which job-matching  effects could not  be  tested  for.1 8The  method-
ological contribution  of this  paper  is to extend  the Hellerstein  and  Neumark
specification into a framework in which one can simultaneously  test  for both
skill formation  and job-matching  in cross section data.
' 8Hellerstein  and  Neumark  were also forced by data  limitation  to consider  profiles only
for those  in the  middle  or at  the  end  of their  career,  which meant  they  could not  use the
experience  profile they  estimated  even to test  for skill formation.
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Appendix:  Coefficients  of Control  Variables
In Non-Linear  SUR Estimation  of Average  Level
Productivity  and Wage  Equations  of Table 3.7
Control Variable  Average  Wage Equation  Productivity Equation
Coefficient  Standard  Coefficient  Standard
Error  Error
DPRIM  0.0418  0.1440  0.2724  0.1448
DSEC  0.0294  0.1359  0.0489  0.1377
DVOC  0.40375  0.1883  0.4356  0.1912
PROFEM2  0.3795  0.1827  0.3027  0.1858
PROFEM3  -0.0784  0.1736  -0.0673  0.1764
PROFEM4  0.3479  0.2385  0.249  0.2402
CRAFT  0.2170  0.1830  0.1756  0.1863
BATCH  0.3746  0.2332  0.1675  0.2351
TEAM  0.0471  0.1505  0.015  0.1522
SIZE2  0.25927  0.1719  -0.0271.4  0.1862
SIZE3  -0.1865  0.1975  -0.2266  0.2443
SIZE4  0.1725  0.2948  0.053  03659
SIZE5  0.9227  0.5227  -0.8276  0.5913
AGE2  -0.0102  0.1406
AGE3  0.0174  0.1197
AGE4  -0.004  0.1386
EQAGE2  0.1859  0.1157
EQAGE3  0.0991  0.1285
EQAGE4  -0.1194  0.1295
YEAR95  -0.4878  0.1270  -0.4953  0.1285
TEXT  -0.1211  0.2807  -0.6158  0.2869
KNIT  0.0822  0.2260  -0.2333  0.2332
GARM  0.0693  0.2006  -0.004,7  0.2048
WOOD  -0.09  0.2163  -0.31460  0.2175
LEATH  0.3058  0.2029  -0.0914  0.2044
OTHIND  0.5111  0.2083  0.1159  0.2085
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